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Asian Socialism and the Forgotten
Architects of Post-Colonial Freedom,
1952–1956*
SU LIN LEWIS
University of Bristol
IN a photograph taken in 1953, Sutan Sjahrir arrives off an airplane inRangoon and is greeted warmly on the tarmac by Burmese socialist
leaders U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein, as well as his close friend Ali
Algadri, the Arab-Indonesian chargé d’affairs. Sjahrir had, for several
months, served as Indonesia’s first Prime Minister, negotiated the
country’s independence at the United Nations, and put in place its first
constitutional guarantees; but he had been sidelined from power by
Sukarno, a political rival since the 1930s. U Ba Swe andUKyawNyein,
meanwhile, were powerful ministers in the new Burmese government.
Along with Ram Manohar Lohia and Asoka Mehta, who had broken
away from the Indian National Congress to start their own socialist
party, they had together planned a conference dedicated to the cause of
Asian socialism. With 200 delegates arriving from as far away as
London and Tokyo, they sought to use the Asian Socialist Conference
to promote socialism as the path out of the mounting international
rivalry between “capitalist democracy” and “totalitarian Communism.”
In the 1950s, Burma was an intellectual hotbed for Afro-Asian
socialism and anti-colonial solidarity. Rangoon was, then, one of
Southeast Asia’s most cosmopolitan cities, a hub on transcontinental
air routes. It hosted visits from the Moscow and San Francisco Ballet,
Chinese intellectuals, Philippine artists, Japanese performance troupes,
and Yugoslav musicians. It was also the first country in post-colonial
Asia or Africa to be ruled by a nominally Socialist Party. Along the*I am grateful to Reem Abou-El-Fadl, Sean Fox, Rachel Leow, Gerard McCann,
Carolien Stolte, Wildan Sena Utama, Eric Tagliacozzo, and two anonymous peer reviewers
for their valuable comments on this piece.
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FIGURE 1. Sjahrir arrives for the Asian Socialist Conference. Left to right: Ali
Algadri, Sutan Sjahrir, U Ba Swe, and U Kyaw Nyein (Sjahrir Family
Collection).
56 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019lines of Yugoslavia, it proclaimed its foreign policy as overtly neutralist.
As such, Burma attracted the attention of socialists from all over the
world, along with European social democrats, American and Soviet
intelligence officers, and African-American and Chinese trade union
leaders attempting to influence its leaders and its people with
propaganda and promises of aid.1 Representatives of Tunisian, Kenyan,
and Rhodesian freedommovements traveled to Burma, sometimes at U
Ba Swe’s expense, to share information about their struggles and
request financial and military assistance.2
Yet the Asian Socialist Conference, and Burma’s broader role as a
hub of post-colonial networking, has largely been overshadowed by the
Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955. There is no other1 See Su Lin Lewis, “‘We are not copyists’: Socialist Networks and Non-Alignment
from Below in A. Philip Randolph’s Asian Journey,” Journal of Social History (forthcoming,
2019).
2 Alijah Gordon, On Becoming Alijah (Kuala Lumpur: Alijah Gordon, 2003), 291.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 57conference in global history that has garnered as much attention in its
symbolic display of Third World solidarity, and none that so enhanced
the global prestige of an emerging group of post-colonial leaders.3 As
Naoko Shimazu has highlighted, Bandung was a theatrical perfor-
mance, in which Sukarno, Nehru, Zhou Enlai, andNasser all performed
the role of international statesmen who embodied the spirit of Third
World nationalism.4 Sukarno and Nasser walked down Freedom Way
in military uniform. Nehru and Zhou Enlai wore their own styles of
modern Indian and Chinese dress in front of the international press. U
Nu wore a Burmese longyi and pinni jacket, dress symbolic of nationalist
sentiment in the colonial era.5 Along with Kwame Nkrumah, who was
never at Bandung but is often remembered there,6 these were the
darlings of the Third World, their faces splashed on the cover of Time
magazine throughout the 1950s. In celebrating the anti-colonial spirit
of the figures so associated with Bandung, the political rivalries out of
which these leaders emerged on center stage tend to be forgotten.
We must therefore ask what other currents of thought have been
silenced in making Bandung such a defining moment of the post-
colonial era. Kyaw Zaw Win has argued that the 1953 Asian Socialist
Conference (ASC) served as a “precursor” to Bandung, highlighting
parallel issues of human rights, anti-colonialism, and Asian-African
solidarity that appeared on the agenda of both events.7 Yet there were
also key differences in the resolutions of both conferences, primarily in
the ASC’s outlining a vision of an Asian welfare state and the
promotion of equal rights for both women and men. While Bandung
adopted some of the most high-profile internationalist resolutions of
the ASC, it was also both a break and a parallel project. Bandung
distinguished itself from the ASC’s project of democratic socialism by3 Christopher J. Lee, ed., Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and its
Political Afterlives (Ohio University Press, 2010); Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds.,
Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2008); Sally Percival Wood, “‘Chou Gags Critics in Bandoeng’ or
How the Media Framed Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference, 1955,” Modern
Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (2010): 1001–1027.
4 Naoko Shimazu, “Diplomacy as Theatre: Staging the Bandung Conference of 1955,”
Modern Asian Studies 48, no. 1 (2014): 225–252.
5 Penny Edwards, “Nationalism by Design: The Politics of Dress in British Burma,” IIAS
Newsletter 46 (2008).
6 Robert Vitalis, “TheMidnight Ride of KwameNkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung
(Ban-Doong),” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and
Development 4, no. 2 (2013): 261–288.
7 Kyaw Zaw Win, “The 1953 Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon: Precursor to the
Bandung Conference,” in Bandung 1955: Little Histories, ed. Derek McDougall and Antonia
Finnane (Victoria: Monash University Publishing, 2010).
58 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019carving out a nationalist trajectory, visibly centered around charismatic
male political leaders with populist appeal. By the mid-1950s, socialist
intellectuals had become increasingly marginalized from mainstream
nationalist politics, by both failing, ironically, to secure mass support for
their parties from electorates and by their censorship and own
disillusionment with politics. This applied to parties across the socialist
world who had taken a prominent role as delegates in Rangoon in 1953.
When he appeared in Rangoon in 1953, the Yugoslavian intellectual
Milovan Djilas was tipped to become Tito’s successor; that same year,
he began airing unorthodox views and would soon become Yugoslavia’s
most prominent dissident.8 Moshe Sharrett, the leader of Israel’s
socialist Mapai party, would by 1956 leave politics in disagreement with
David Ben Gurion’s military escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Unlike the high-profile 1955 Bandung conference, delegates at the
Asian Socialist Conference understood conferences to be ephemeral
events, whose “spirit” needed to be sustained through regular contact
and the circulation of information. As such, the ASC was not a one-off
event but became an organizational body, with its secretariat based at
Rangoon. From here, it published a number of periodicals and
pamphlets to reach Asian as well as African audiences, including
Socialist Asia, banned by the British governor of Kenya in 1954, and the
Anti-Colonial Bureau Newsletter, which covered anti-colonial struggles
on the African continent, Malaya, and Indochina from June 1954.
Some of these publications are likely to have been read by circles
around key political leaders. The ASCmaintained regular contact with
the Socialist International and International Union of Socialist Youth.
Bureau meetings were held in Hyderabad and Tokyo, as well as the
Burmese hill station of Kalaw, after a failed attempt to hold a meeting in
Bandung in 1954 due to visa restrictions imposed by Sukarno’s
government. A Second Asian Socialist Conference was held in
Bombay in November 1956, in the midst of the Suez Crisis and
Hungarian Uprising. As both an event and a “permanent” organiza-
tional body, the Asian Socialist Conference maintained connections
through the circulation of information and ideas, and a commitment to
a more peaceful international world order both immediately before and
after Bandung.
This might lead us to ask of conferences in the Afro-Asian era, why
are some conferences more visible than others, and how do they
entrench state-centered narratives? Were notions of individual8 Joshua Muravchik, “The Intellectual Odyssey of Milovan Djilas,” World Affairs 145,
no. 4 (1983): 323–346.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 59freedom and democracy incompatible with the state-centered socialism
advocated by post-colonial governments? How did the fractious politics
of the post-colonial state get in the way of the socialist dream of a
“Third Force,” an alternative movement to Cold War power blocs?
And finally, what were their legacies? While socialists may have
dropped out of the political scene, their ideas nonetheless held
important intellectual influence; popular nationalist political parties
promoted a socialist agenda while retaining centralized control and
implementing censorship regimes, as civil society actors, often critics
of the state, took inspiration from earlier generations of socialist
intellectuals. Socialist intellectuals who were not exiled, jailed, or co-
opted as technocrats within new regimes were sent abroad as
diplomats or as representatives at the UN on account of their fluency
in English and other European languages. Along with the 1947
Asian Relations Conference, the Asian Socialist Conference provided
first-hand experiences in the field of international diplomacy between
new post-colonial nations. While the intellectuals examined here
were deeply committed to the promises of the United Nations in
advocating self-determination, world peace, and human rights, they
were also its fiercest critics when its founders failed to live up to those
ideals. As such, they embodied the spirit of international cooperation
and drew from an older lineage of socialist internationalism, radically
remade for the post-colonial world.
Focusing on the efforts of this new, post-colonial generation of
socialist intellectuals in the 1950s, in parallel to the epochal Bandung
conference, enables us to think about alternative visions and paths
outside teleological narratives of post-colonial nationalism, dominated
by key political leaders. This article focuses in particular on the role of
socialist intellectuals from Indonesia and Burma, two countries that
are surprisingly absent from the broad resurgence of scholarship on
the Bandung era, despite their prominent place as hosts and key
participants in its events. Rangoon has been conspicuously absent in
the literature on the arc of sites where the Third World was “‘made,”9
and while some scholars have emphasized the Indonesian context for
Bandung, more might be said on Indonesia’s role as an incubator of
Afro-Asian networks in the years before and after Bandung,9 See especially Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World
(New York: New Press People’s History, 2007); Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and
Nada Boskovska, The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade
(London: Routledge, 2014); Mark Berger, “After the Third World? History, Destiny and the
Fate of Third Worldism,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2004): 9–39.
60 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019particularly at the non-diplomatic level.10 Burmese and Indonesian
socialist intellectuals, along with their Indian and Japanese counter-
parts, cultivated some of the most concrete and traceable networks in
early Cold War Asia, and began a project of Third World solidarity
committed to the end of colonialism across Asia and Africa. Moreover,
they sought to make space for individual freedom and human dignity
against imperialism and what they saw as the totalitarian impulses of
European and Japanese fascism and Soviet communism. Their politics
would, at times, be criticized by their compatriots as elitist and lofty,
but their most lasting legacies came in their efforts to build a world
free of exploitation, one that valued individual freedoms within
egalitarian states.RANGOON: THE INTERSECTION OF ASIAN SOCIALIST NETWORKS
In the 1950s and 1960s, conferences were essential in creating notions
of solidarity and collective purpose among Asians and Africans. They
were facilitated by the growing accessibility of air travel, and the
spending power of new post-colonial governments and political parties
to engage in international diplomacy, particularly with leaders and
activists in other newly decolonized nations. The arc of conferences of
the post-colonial era begins in Delhi in 1947 with the Asian Relations
Conference, hosted by Jawaharlal Nehru. It was here that Asian
socialists first mooted the idea of a special conference to discuss a
common program for the development of Asia. Nehru gave Sjahrir,
then Indonesian Prime Minister, a grand welcome at the airport. The
Indonesian delegation, however, was led by Sjahrir’s political rivals,
and Sjahrir began engaging in discussions with other socialist
intellectuals from elsewhere in Asia. It was felt, Sjahrir later recounted,
that “the ideology for a united Asia should have a more integrated
content.”11 The emerging ideological solidarity between socialist
parties occurred as Indian, Indonesian, and Burmese socialists sought to10 Jamie Mackie, “The Bandung Conference and Afro-Asian Solidarity” in Bandung
1955, ed. McDougall and Finnane; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia and the Bandung
Conference: Then and Now,” Bandung Revisited; Wildan Sena Utama, “From Brussels to
Bogor: Contacts, Networks and the History of the Bandung Conference 1955,” Journal of
Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities 6, no. 1 (2016); Katharine McGregor and Vanessa
Herman, “Challenging the Lifeline of Imperialism: Reassessing Afro-Asian Solidarity and
Related Activism in the Decade 1955–1965,” in Bandung, Global History, and International
Law, ed. Eslava, Fakhri, and Nesiah (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
11 Sutan Sjahrir, “Reflections,” Socialist Asia 2:10.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 61carve out a place within the messy and divisive realm of post-colonial
politics. Rapid transitions to parliamentary democracy were accom-
panied by heightened political factionalism that drastically split the
unified fronts of anti-colonial resistance. Socialist parties competed
with communists, religious parties, the military, and mass nationalist
parties centered around charismatic leaders. While socialist parties in
Burma and Indonesia had once been aligned with more hardline
Marxists during the Japanese resistance era and after, they had now split
due to differences in ideology and strategy.
While Talbot Imlay has shown that Asian socialists were first and
foremost regarded as anti-colonial nationalists by European socialists,
we need to be careful about generalizing their politics without
considering the competing visions of nationalism, and international-
ism, that emerged at this time, and the ideological tensions that both
united and divided Asian socialists. Imlay argues that what united
Asian socialist parties was not so much a policy of “non-alignment,” as
in Bandung, but a rapid end to colonialism; one which European
socialists disdained in favor of development.12 However, “non-
alignment” as a diplomatic policy did not emerge from Bandung, as
is so often claimed, but much later, with “neutralist” policies like those
of India and Burma laying its groundwork.13 The idea of creating a
“Third Force” to counter the excesses of communism and capitalism
emerged in the post-war era, both in Europe, in the radical wing of the
post-war British Labour party,14 and in Asia.
While the memory of colonial subjugation animated their anti-
colonial sentiment, Asian socialists were simultaneously committed to
the idea of the “Third Force,” seeing the spread of socialism as a
peaceful solution to the antagonistic forces of the ColdWar. Moreover,
they believed that Asian socialists could succeed where Europe failed.
In advocating for an end to European colonialism in Southeast Asia
and Africa, they sought also to spread the socialist message to the post-
colonial world and steel it against interference from America and the
Soviet Union. When European socialists characterized Asian parties as12 Talbot C. Imlay, “International Socialism and Decolonization during the 1950s:
Competing Rights and the Postcolonial Order,” The American Historical Review 118, no. 4
(2013): 1105–1132.
13 See Lee, Making a World, 15; Lorenz M. Lüthi, “Non-Alignment, 1946–1965: Its
Establishment and Struggle against Afro-Asianism,” Humanity: An International Journal of
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 7, no. 2 (2016): 201–223; Itty Abraham,
“From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947–65,”
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 46, no. 2 (2008): 195–219.
14 Jonathan Schneer, “Hopes Deferred or Shattered: The British Labour Left and the
Third Force Movement, 1945–49,”The Journal of Modern History 56, no. 2 (1984): 198–226.
62 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019overtly “nationalist,”, they highlighted their own insecurities vis-à-vis
colonialism, particularly after being confronted with the ire of Asian
intellectuals (illustrated below); this characterization, however,
obscures the complex layers underlying the position of Asian socialist
intellectuals and undermines their commitment to the promotion of
socialism in the Afro-Asian world.
The leaders of Indonesian and Indian socialist parties studied the
workings of socialism both at home and abroad. Sjahrir, the head of the
Indonesian Socialist Party, spent his student years in interwar Europe,
working with trade unions and the youth wing of the Dutch Social
Democratic Workers’ party. When Sjahrir returned to Java he began
working extensively with the Indonesian labor movement.15 He
led part of the resistance movement against the Japanese and founded
the Socialist Party through a merger with Amir Sjahrifuddin’s
“Socialist” party in 1945.16 That year, Sjahrir published Our Struggle,
a fiery manifesto criticizing collaborators with the Japanese (and
implicitly Sukarno), and calling for a constitution that would guarantee
the broadest possible democratic rights.17 It predicted the economic
dislocation of the post-colonial world, and the emergence of “a
new kind of imperialism” in the fundamental struggle between “neo-
capitalism or socialism.”18 Sjahrir’s technocratic faith in a mixed
economy, a socialist state that made room for private enterprise,
ultimately collided with Amir’s more populist and orthodox commit-
ment to socialism.19 The party split in 1948; Amir sought mass support
and formed coalitions with the Indonesian Communist Party, while
Sjahrir cultivated a “cadre” party to develop an ordered plan for the
development of the state.2015 Rudolf Mrázek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia
Program, 1994), 75–77 and 93–95 (I am indebted to this rich and sensitive biography of
Sjahrir, as later footnotes will show); Jafar Suryomenggolo, Organising under the Revolution:
Unions and the State in Java, 1945–48 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2013), 66–67.
16 See George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1952), 158; Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation
and Resistance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); J. D. Legge, Intellectuals
and Nationalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Following Recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupied
Jakarta (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988), 171.
17 Anderson, “Introduction,” in Our Struggle Translated and with an Introduction by
Benedict Anderson, ed. Sutan Sjahrir and Benedict Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell University
Southeast Asia Program, 1968), 24.
18 Sutan Sjahrir, “Our Struggle,” in Our Struggle Translated and with an Introduction by
Benedict Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1968), 24.
19 Legge, 176.
20 On the PSI’s approach to politics, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional
Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell, 1962), 130.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 63Within the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), noticeable divisions
emerged between Sjahrir’s elite Jakarta intellectual circle, and a more
grassroots East Java group.21 While Sjahrir helped found the Asian
Socialist Conference, gave key speeches, and wrote for its publications,
socialists from East Java played an active role in the everyday machi-
nery of the ASC. The delegation to the 1952 Preparatory conference
was led by Djohan Sjahroezah, a veteran journalist and revolutionary
leader who had first connected Sjahrir with the labor movement, led oil
worker unions, and maintained close links with members of the
Indonesian Communist Party. Wijono, initially a member of Amir’s
circle, had once encouraged the legendary Indonesian Marxist Tan
Malaka to head the Socialist Party,22 and would later become Joint
Secretary-General of the ASC. While both were deeply committed to
Sjahrir, their backgrounds indicate different but interconnected
approaches to politics: Sjahrir’s Jakarta circle helped provide the
intellectual basis of the modern state, while the East Java circle led the
cultivation of popular support and raised awareness among grassroots
labor and underground movements.
Like Sjahrir, the founders of the Praja Socialist party in India also
cut their political teeth in the world of anti-colonial internationalism
in Europe. Ram Manohar Lohia had studied in 1920s Berlin, a haven
for anticolonial activists in Europe and later the operative center for
the League Against Imperialism.23 In the 1930s Nehru appointed
Lohia, then an active member of the Indian National Congress (INC),
to the party’s foreign department, where he cultivated ties with freedom
movements across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. After the
assassination of Gandhi, his mentor, Lohia left the INC in 1948 to
help form a progressive alternative in the Congress Socialist Party,
joining with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party.24 The new Praja Socialist
Party, led by Lohia, Jayaprakash Narayan, and Asoka Mehta, was by
1952 the major opposition party to the INC. While Nehru is generally
associated with generating the idea of “Non-Alignment,”25 Lohia had
put forth his idea of a “Third Camp” in 1950, which would act as a bloc21 Interview with Ita F. Nadia, February 16, 2017 (activist and daughter of Dayino, in
Rangoon as part of the ASC Preparatory Committee for some months). On Djohan
Sjahroezah see: Legge, 100–107; Riadi Ngasiran, Kesabaran Revolusioner: Djohan Sjahroezah
Pejuang Kemerdekaan Bawah Tanah (2015); and Anderson, Java, 205.
22 Anderson, Java, 282 fn 38.
23 See Frederik Petersson, “Hub of the Anti-imperialist Movement: The League
Against Imperialism and Berlin, 1927–1933,” Interventions 16, no. 1 (2014): 49–71.
24 Saul Rose, Socialism in Southern Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).
25 Luthi, “Non-Alignment,” 203.
64 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019on the inter-governmental level, and at the popular and party-political
level would take the form of a more dynamic “Third Force.”26 Both
ideas would be taken up in the writings and speeches of his Indonesian
and Burmese colleagues. For Lohia, it was Asia, and later Afro-Asia,
that could begin a “Third Camp” with a clean state, one which, unlike
Europe, could adopt a position of genuine neutrality.27 Due to
colonialism, Asia had fundamentally different problems of economic
development than Europe.28 Mehta, meanwhile, looked towards
Europe and “evolutionary socialism,” seeing democratic socialism as a
reply to the “dehumanisation caused by totalitarian communism.”29
In 1951, Lohia and his party traveled to Japan to meet with
delegates of the Japanese Socialist Party, split into Right and Left
factions due to ideological differences over the origins of the Korean
War.30 As Heonik Kwon has argued, the Korean War was the “first
violent manifestation of the bipolar global order,” one that provoked
heated public debate over its origins both domestically and
internationally.31 The Japanese Socialist Party’s Left faction became
more vocally committed to unarmed neutralism; it quickly attached
itself to Lohia’s notion of an Asian “Third Force,” taking a more anti-
American and pro-Asian stance in the midst of America’s occupation
in post-war Japan.32 The Right, meanwhile, rejected “third force
neutralism” on account of its fears of communism, looking instead to
actively promote the spread of democratic socialism and affiliate with
the Socialist International. Both sides were united in denouncing their
“fascist” opponents, distancing themselves from the policy pursued by
Japanese militarists in the past, and believed in the importance of
building ties with socialist counterparts in Asia, not least because of
their interests in cooperative economic development. Despite the
devastation of the war, Burma recognized the importance of Japan in
providing aid to help with post-war reconstruction, and also invited
Japanese socialists to send observers to the first Preparatory Meeting of26 Lohia, The Third Camp in World Affairs (Bombay: Praja Socialist Party, 1950), 45.
27 Ibid., 49–50.
28 Gopal Krishan, “Rammanohar Lohia: An Appreciation,” Economic and Political
Weekly 3, no. 26/27 (1968): 1109.
29 Mehta, “Final Lap,” Socialist Asia 1, no. 4 (1952): 15; Asoka Mehta, Studies in Asian
Socialism (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1959). Differences between Lohia andMehta’s
thought are also noted in Talbot Imlay, The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European
Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960 (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 448.
30 J. A. Stockwin, “The Neutralist Policy of the Japan Socialist Party,” PhD diss.,
Australian National University, 1964.
31 Heonik Kwon, The Other Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
32 Stockwin, 2.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 65the ASC in 1952. Indonesia, however, was less sanguine about Japan’s
involvement; at the 1953 conference, Indonesian attendees refused to
listen as one member of the Japanese Socialist Party, Mosaburo Suzuki,
rose to speak. This was followed by a deep bow from Suzuki, and
apology for the “indescribable acts of suffering inflicted on our brothers
in Asia.” The Indonesians were reportedly moved, particularly on
hearing that many of their socialist brothers were in prison because of
their opposition to Japanese fascism.33
Unlike Sjahrir and Lohia, the founders of the Burma Socialist Party
were schooled not in Europe but in Rangoon University, a hotbed of
anti-imperial sentiment by the 1930s.34 U Nu, U Ba Swe, and U Kyaw
Nyein had all been students in the 1930s, with U Ba Swe leading a
major anti-colonial protest that brought together students with oil
workers. In 1944, born out of the resistance to the Japanese, they
formed the AFPFL, a coalition between socialists and communists, and
supporters in peasant associations, trade unions, and women’s, youth,
and ethnic organizations, with the Burma Socialist Party formed in
1945.35 As with the Japanese Socialist Party, the Korean War was also
an important flashpoint in splitting the AFPFL coalition after the war.
In a surprising deviation from its neutralist policy, Burma voted with
the General Assembly to condemn North Koreans as aggressors (a vote
on which India and Indonesia abstained).36 This split the Burma
Socialist Party in 1950, with a large faction forming the BurmaWorkers
and Peasants Party (BWPP), lambasting the government as “serfs of
the capitalo-expansionists” and pledging to uphold Marxist-Leninist
principles.37 The following year, Burma held its first elections, with
the AFPFL winning an overwhelming victory, and the BWPP in
opposition.
The ideological competition between charismatic national leaders,
socialists, and communists escalated in the post-war period amidst the
jockeying for political power, and soon became manifest in the
overlapping journeys of the Afro-Asian era. In 1952, as the Burma
Socialist Party hosted the preparatory meeting for the Asian Socialist33 Hamid Algadri, “Prime Minister Sjahrir as Statesman and Diplomat” [Unpublished
Memoir], 81, Hamid Algadri Personal Papers, Jakarta (henceforth Algadri Memoir).
34 Aye Kyaw, The Voice of Young Burma (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia
Program, 1993); Su Lin Lewis, Cities in Motion: Urban Life and Cosmopolitanism in Southeast
Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 215–226.
35 See Kyaw Zaw Win, “A History of the Burma Socialist Party (1930–1964),”
Dissertation (School of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 2008).
36 Frank N. Trager, “Burma’s Foreign Policy, 1948–56: Neutralism, Third Force, and
Rice,” The Journal of Asian Studies 16, no. 1 (1956): 91.
37 Ibid.
66 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019Conference, members of the BWPP traveled by ship to Beijing to
attend the Asia-Pacific Peace Conference, discussed by Rachel Leow
elsewhere in this issue. Burma’s post-war government became locked in
a civil war with the Burmese Communist Party, which they believed to
be taking orders fromMoscow. As head of the Burma Socialist Party, as
well as the largest organization of Burmese trade unions, U Ba Swe
criticized his former allies in the Burmese Communist Party, while
remaining close to the labor movements with whom he had cultivated
close ties. As he told an American journalist in 1952, his opposition to
Soviet communism stemmed in part from a visit to the Soviet Union
and Poland in 1949; while he had once respected Stalin, the Soviet
Union’s ambitions in Eastern Europe were akin to Japanese imperialism
in Southeast Asia.38 U Kyaw Nyein, meanwhile, had been invited to
Yugoslavia in 1952, which under Tito had famously refused to become a
Soviet satellite.39 While both U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein still
considered themselves Marxists, both were wary about the new threat
of Soviet imperialism, and looked with both admiration and fear at
their powerful Chinese neighbor.
Rangoon thus became a transnational hub for like-minded socialists
from Indonesia, India, Burma, and Japan to engage in the work of
socialist internationalism with an Asian inflection. The speech given
by U Kyaw Nyein to delegates at the preparatory meeting stressed a
legacy of common suffering, and the need for Asian Socialist Parties to
look to each other to solve common problems. Echoing Lohia’s notion
of a “Third Camp,” U Kyaw Nyein argued:Emb
UniIt is for Asian Socialist Parties to head a Third Camp, and try their level
best to save the world from theThirdGreatWarwhile they still can. It is
for the Asian Socialist Parties to offer an alternative to Capitalist
Democracy and Totalitarian Communism namely in the form of
Democratic Socialism . . . World Public Opinion will be with us.40The idea that Asian socialists continued to cultivate the support of
“public opinion,” in favor of peace, was a central principle of the
organization. The Preparatory Meeting resulted not only in an
agreement to co-organize the First Asian Socialist Conference but also
to act as an information hub, gathering news about Asian socialist38 Interview with U Ba Swe by Louis Fischer, October 1, 1952, RG84 Burma U.S.
assy Files, 1950–52 Box 7, NARA.
39 Alvin Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World (Princeton: Princeton
versity Press, 1970).
40 U Kyaw Nyein, “Common Ties that Bind us Together,” Socialist Asia 1, no. 3 (1952).
FIGURE 2. Rangoon City Hall, 1945 (Creative Commons).
Lewis: Asian Socialism 67parties from Cairo to Tokyo. From 1952, a fortnightly bulletin, Socialist
Asia, published news of various socialist parties and preparations for the
conference, as well as short articles by core members of the committee
on various themes related to socialism, the “Third Force,” and post-
colonial politics.
The First Asian Socialist Conference took place across a full week,
between January 6 and 15, with meetings and seminars held at City
Hall, built in the 1920s in an architectural mix of Art Deco and
Burmese ornamentation (see Fig. 2). Official delegates included the
Japanese, Indonesian, Burmese, and Indian socialist parties as well
as the Pan-Malayan Labour Party, Socialist Party of Pakistan, the
Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon, the Socialist Party of Israel
(Mapai), and the Socialist Party of Egypt. “Observers” came from
Tunisia, Gold Coast, Uganda, Algeria, Kenya, and Nepal. Invitations
were also sent to nationalist parties in Syria, Iraq, Gold Coast, and
Nigeria, who expressed solidarity with the Asian socialist project but
were unable to afford the flight. As the former Prime Minister who had
presided over Burma’s independence, Clement Atlee, representing
the Socialist International, was the most high-profile guest at the
conference and hosted by U Nu. The Burmese press lauded Atlee’s
68 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019experience as a “social worker in the slums of East London” to ratify his
socialist credentials.41 Also present as “fraternal delegates” were
members of the Socialist International, the International Union of
Socialist Youth, and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the
Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism. While European socialists, as
Imlay and Peter van Kemseke have shown,42 engaged with Asian
socialists to expand and globalize their membership, Asian socialists
had used the Socialist International and its contacts to extend its own
networks across “Asia,” broadly conceived as extending from Japan to
Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon.
Unlike other conferences of the Afro-Asian era or even conferences
of the Socialist International,43 the Asian Socialist Conference was
conducted in English, without translators. This speaks to multi-
lingualism of its participants and the fluency of delegates schooled in
British colonial institutions and mission schools. Saul Rose, who was at
the conference, noted that because English was the official language, as
at the Asian Relations Conference, “The conference was rarely delayed
by the need for translation. Still more important, the participants were
able to meet and talk informally and without intermediaries outside the
conference rooms.”44 These informal, fluid conversations led to an
emerging sense of affinity between conference delegates and worked to
build a collective shared purpose. Rose argued that the “advantage
accrued to the massive and talkative Indian delegation.” The numbers
reflect some truth in this: the Praja Socialist Party sent 77 delegates,
compared to the 26 delegates of the Indonesian Socialist Party, the
second largest group. Rose noted that a disadvantage was suffered by
Japanese, Indonesians, and Yugoslavia’s Milovan Djilas. But Djilas’
ideas were nonetheless communicated fluently in the press, and he
hosted a number of seminars and debates during the conference.
Indonesian socialist intellectuals were schooled in Dutch, with some
students learning English and other modern European languages in
government secondary schools in Batavia and Yogyakarta.45 Some, like
Sjahroezah, were also journalists, able to practice their English as they41 “Asian Socialist Conference: Atlee’s Forthcoming Visit to Rangoon,” The Burman,
December 19, 1952.
42 See Imlay, Socialist Internationalism and Peter Van Kemseke, Towards an Era of
Development: The Globalization of Socialism and Christian Democracy, 1945–1965 (Leuven:
Leuven University Press, 2006) and Imlay, The Practice of International Socialism.
43 Dogliani, Patrizia. “The Fate of Socialist Internationalism,” in Internationalisms: A
Twentieth-Century History, ed. Glenda Sluga and Patricia Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017).
44 Rose, 7.
45 Legge, 119.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 69read the Reuters and AP wires and other English-language newspapers
in the region to report on regional and international news. English
versions of speeches given in other languages were to be provided with
the help of the delegations concerned.46
This gatheringof intellectuals andpoliticians didnot takeplace solely
behind closed doors. A mass rally took place with 100,000 members of
the Burmese public in attendance; the high number likely attributable to
U Ba Swe’s chairmanship of the Burma Trade Union Congress and its
large organizational reach.47 Speeches from Asian and African socialist
leaders drummed up support for anti-colonial solidarity. Margaret Pope,
representing the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism, spoke on
behalf of delegates from Morocco who were unable to attend.48 While
committeemeetingswereheldduring theday, lively seminars,opento the
press and thepublic,wereheld inCityHall in theevenings. Inhis seminar
on “Nationalism and Internationalism,” Sjahrir gave a broad overview
of the development of European and Asian nationalism and spoke on
the necessity of the United Nations as a governing world body, inciting
a lively discussion between Scandinavian, Yugoslavian, and Asian
socialists on the challenges of international cooperation.49 Atlee’s
seminar on parliamentary democracy was interrupted by fiery Indian
intellectuals like G.K. Reddy, who accused European socialists of failing
to apply universal socialist principles in upholding colonialism.50 Tayeb
Salim, the Asian representative of Tunisia’s banned nationalist Neo
Destourparty, gavea rousing seminaron “FreedomMovements inAfrica. ”
He urged all socialists to end the “massacres taking place in Tunisia and
Morocco” and implored Asian socialists to impress upon the Socialist
International theurgencyofputtinganendto theviolence; this resulted in
a bitter clash with French socialist André Bidet, carrying the discussion
past midnight.51 It is no wonder, then, that the reports of the Socialist
International focused on the “nationalism” of socialists at the conference,
given the popular focus on anti-colonialism and the animosity directed at
European delegates.46 “Report of the First Asian Socialist Conference” (Rangoon, 1953), 90. (Henceforth
“First ASC Report”).
47 Photo caption, New Times of Burma, January 13, 1953.
48 “Asian Socialist Conference Sponsors at BAA Stadium,” New Times of Burma,
January 13, 1953.
49 Soetan Sjahrir, Nationalism and Internationalism (Rangoon: Asian Socialist
Conference, 1953).
50 “Relations between European and Asian Socialists: Lively Discussions at City Hall,”
New Times of Burma, January 14, 1953. “Political Harangues Mar Socialist Seminar,” The
Nation, January 14, 1953.
51 “Tunisian Sounds off on colonialism issue,” The Nation, January 10, 1953.
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excitement among European socialists, who sought a more active
engagement with the decolonizing world. Due to increasing disen-
chantment with European regionalism, European socialists put the
development of the “ThirdWorld” on its foreign policy agenda, seeking
to bring the Asian Socialist Conference into its fold.52 During the
conference, Asian socialists pushed back on this, continually arguing
that they had different goals and aims than European socialists due to
shared histories of colonialism and the agricultural base of their
economies. This is vividly captured in a story recounted in the memoirs
of Indonesian socialist Hamid Algadri about one of the British Labour
Delegation waking him up in his hotel room late at night to find out
why the Asian Socialists were refusing to unite with the Socialist
International.53 Algadri, confused, had told him he was not the right
person to ask, but that he was inclined to agree with the resolution,
based on the great differences in wages, rights, and living standards
between the British and Indonesian laborer. When the European
socialist outlined plans for providing aid to “underdeveloped areas,”
Algadri asked why, realistically, British workers would want to give up
part of their hard-earned rights and income to help socialists in Asia,
and that in comparison to the Asian laborer, the European laborer was a
“capitalist” from the viewpoint of income and salary.54 After a moment
of silence, the European acknowledged that he was beginning to
understand the Asian Socialist position and left.55 This vignette
captures the skepticism with which Asian socialists viewed the
Socialist International and its failure to recognize the different contexts
and struggles facing workers in the colonial world, and echoes points
made by Asian feminists in refusing to be co-opted within European-led
international women’s movements.56 In the end, delegates at the
ASC resolved not to join the Socialist International, but agreed to
coordinate with the body as a separate organization.
In an analysis of the conference that appeared in Indonesian
socialist periodicals, the socialist intellectual Soedjatmoko argued that
the conference’s great triumph was in overcoming the diversity of views52 See Van Kemseke and Imlay, The Practice of International Socialism.
53 This is likely Saul Rose, the only other official delegate in the British Labour Party
apart from Atlee.
54 A similar point is made in Lohia, Third Camp, 6–7.
55 Algadri Memoir, 80.
56 See, for instance, Sumita Mukherjee, “The All-Asian Women’s Conference 1931:
Indian Women and their Leadership of a Pan-Asian Feminist Organisation,” Women’s
History Review 26, no. 3 (2017): 363–381.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 71on socialism within Asia. While socialism in Japan developed within
an industrial economy, he argued, a gulf of experience existed between
colonized and non-colonized countries. Socialism in India could not be
separated from the influence of Gandhi, while socialism in Egypt was
characterized by hostility towards the West. The Indian socialist party,
he argued, was somewhat “impractical,” having not had the experience
of governing. And yet, he concluded, Asian socialists had come to-
gether with an awareness of their differences, convinced about the
unity of the socialist movement as an antidote to both communism and
capitalism. While Asian socialists were united in the shared history of
colonialism and the underdevelopment of the economy, they were
conscious that the Socialist International would not be able to meet
their needs.57 Nationalism, he argued, was a “framework” (rangka) for
the struggle of socialism in Asia. The views of European socialists, who
saw anti-colonialism as the key concern of Asian socialists, failed to
consider their end goal: that liberation was a pathway for a newer,
better socialism attuned to the realities of Asia and Africa.DRAFTING THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND A
NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
If the Bandung Conference outlined the principles of diplomatic and
economic cooperation between emerging nations of the Third World,
then the Asian Socialist Conference was first and foremost concerned
with outlining the ideal character of the post-colonial state, one that
valued collective social welfare as well as individual rights. Despite the
claims of European socialists that Asian socialists were always divided,
and “agreed on little else”58 than anti-colonial nationalism, this set of
resolutions indicates a strong collective belief in the welfare state as a
basis of social security, along with a protection of democratic rights.
While the European welfare state provided a model, Asian socialists
devised these plans in committee meetings that did not include
European counterparts, and they echo many of the rights enshrined in
the first constitutions of Indonesia and Burma. The first set of resolu-
tions defined socialism as distinct from totalitarianism, to be realized
through democratic means. Socialism would uphold the “democratic
rights of the people, namely freedom of speech, of organization, of57 Sujatmoko, “Socialis Asia,” Sikap no. 4, January 26, 1953 (reprinted from Siasat).
58 Imlay, 1110.
72 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019assembly, of faith and conscience, of election of representative bodies,”
rights to be “granted to all.”59 It would, crucially, imply the right of
opposition parties to exist and operate. It would safeguard basic
economic and social rights, including the right to work, free medical
care, support for the elderly, and the “right of children and the young to
good care,” and the right to decent housing.60 In recognition of the
different applications of socialism in different country-contexts, it
advocated mutual collaboration between socialist movements.
Indonesia’s constitution of 1949, which Sjahrir helped to draft, had
stripped away many of the president’s executive powers put forth with
Sukarno’s initial proclamation of the Republic. The 1949 constitution,
first drafted in 1946while Sjahrir was PrimeMinister, included many of
the democratic rights and rights to social security set out in the first set
of resolutions of the ASC. In a letter, Maria Ulfah Santoso, who served
as Social Minister in Sjahrir’s cabinet, informedMary Saran, the leader
of the women’s wing of the Socialist International, that, in her view,
the basis of a Socialist Country was already laid down in this consti-
tution.61 Sjahrir’s faith in parliamentary democracy, coupled with the
extension of social services to all, stemmed in part from the example of
the European welfare state. As a student and anti-colonial activist,
Sjahrir traveled around Europe witnessing various models of govern-
ment. As Mrazek notes, in Sjahrir’s political hierarchy of the 1950s,
Scandinavian countries topped his list, while France and Britain were
generally absent; this world-view could safely disregard the U.S. and
the Soviet Union, who had not yet made it into the community of
welfare states.62 Similarly, while Sjahrir seemed to have jettisoned the
British model, Mehta and Lohia made frequent reference to the success
of Scandinavia and Labour Britain in providing a model that catered for
the welfare of all. The adoption of the welfare state model, then,
signaled a method of cutting across the warring camps of the ColdWar.
The model of the welfare state was also enacted in Burma via the
policies of Burma’s democratically elected coalition government, headed
by U Nu and the Burma Socialist Party. In 1952, Burma’s welfare state
took the formofPyidawtha (coinedbyNuandoften translatedas “Welfare
Plan” or “Happy Land”), an eight-year plan of social and economic
improvement. Burmese socialists saw this as a phase in their social59 First ASC Report, 94.
60 Ibid., 94.
61 Letter from Maria Ulfah Santoso to Mary Saran, December 31, 1956 in ICSDW
Archives Indonesia File, IISH.
62 Mrazek, 429.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 73revolution, and a uniquely Burmese solution rather than, in U Ba Swe’s
words, a “carbon copy of Russian or Chinese revolutionary patterns.”63
Based on the idea of “self-help,” every township was to receive a
government allowance, with committees proposing projects for villages
within the township.64 As Tharaphi Than has argued, the plan aimed to
legitimizeBurma’spost-wardevelopmentpoliciesandcounteraccusations
of the influence of foreign aid, while winning over rural villagers in an
ongoing war against Burmese communists.65 In Socialist Asia, Ba Swe
outlined the economic, social, and political rights underlying the
“SocialistPyidawthaState,”asstatedinthe1948Constitutionestablished
by a multi-ethnic assembly of “Shans, Chins, Kachins, Karens, Mons,
Kayahs, andBurmese.”Eachpersonwas to enjoy facilities of “modern and
progressive education, irrespective of sex, wealth, or social status,” as well
asmedical facilities andhousing.66Pyidawthawas to guarantee individual
freedom and address the anxieties of the ludu (people) over food, shelter,
and clothing by building a modern welfare state.
In particular contrast to Bandung’s FinalCommuniqué, whichmakes
nomentionofwomen’s rights, theAsianSocialistConference advocated
full equal rights to women regardless of caste or creed, and pledged “to be
the vehicle of ensuring to women full equality of rights and dignity of
position.”67 Elsewhere, the resolutions acknowledged “the social and
political handicaps under which women in Asia suffer,” and advocated
that Asian socialists “should combat prejudice and ignorance which
militate against enjoyment of equal rights by women.”68 As “modern,”
educated reformers, these socialist intellectuals were keen to portray
themselves as attuned to progressive ideals of gender equality.69 Given
the prominence of the Burmese and Indonesian delegations, the deeply
rooted Southeast Asian perception of women as having “high status,”
should be taken into account, alongside Lohia’s radical views on gender
and caste equality in India.70 Moreover, unlike in Bandung, where63 Maung, Maung, “Pyidawtha Comes to Burma,” Far Eastern Survey (1953): 117–119;
U Ba Swe, The Burmese Revolution (Rangoon: Union of Burma Information Department,
1952), 4.
64 Ibid.
65 Tharaphi Than, “The Languages of Pyidawtha and the Burmese Approach to
National Development,” South East Asia Research 21, no. 4 (2013): 639–654.
66 U Ba Swe, “Burma builds for Socialism,” Socialist Asia 2, no. 11 (1954).
67 First ASC Report, 94.
68 Ibid., 99.
69 Kumari Jayawardene, Nationalism and Feminism in the Third World (Zed, 1986), 12.
70 See: Barbara Andaya, The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern
Southeast Asia (Honolulu, 2006); Chie Ikeya, “The ‘Traditional’ High Status of Women in
Burma: A Historical Reconsideration,” Journal of Burma Studies 10, no. 1 (2005): 51–81; on
74 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019women were prominently “invisible,” as Shimazu has noted, female
delegates did attend the ASC, including six Indian female delegates and
at least three Japanese female delegates.71 Maria Ulfah Santoso was also
part of the Indonesian delegation; Santoso was not only Indonesia’s first
female cabinet minister, but a close friend of Sjahrir; the two had studied
together in theNetherlandswhenSantosowaspursuinga lawdegree.The
participation of these women, and their friendships and collegiate
relationships with leading male socialists, no doubt contributed to the
shaping of the ASC resolutions on equal rights for women.
The socialist state, built on equality between peoples, was to be
mirrored in the international realm by the equality of states. The second
set of resolutions thus centered on “Asia and World Peace.”Again, the
resolutions advocated democratic means, rather than revolution, as
the key to Asia’s reemergence in world politics after recovering from
the “yokes of imperialism and feudalism.”72 They pledged an end to
colonial rule, citing the struggle against colonial rule as the essence of
human protest against subjection, degradation, and poverty. Here, as
Kyaw ZawWin has argued, the parallels with Bandung’s resolutions are
most clear.73 While Asian socialists upheld the principles of the UN
Charter as the basis for world peace, they also acknowledged the
imbalances and processes of polarizationmanifest in the structure of the
United Nations (particularly the exclusivity of the Security Council).
More forcefully, it was up to Asian nations to enable and uphold the
principles of the UN charter as a basis of justice, peace, and equality.
Resolutions also advocated coordination and cooperation of Asian
countries, recognizing shared conditions of agricultural prominence
and low productivity, and the need to own the means of production.
Finally, as with Bandung, this set of resolutions argued for the
importance of human rights, which were associated with the struggles
against colonial oppression (Kyaw Zaw Win points out that U Tun
Win, one of the speakers for human rights at the ASC, was one of the
few ASC members also present at Bandung as Burma’s Minister of
Information).74 As Roland Burke has shown with regards to Bandung,Lohia see Jaya Shrivastava, “Locating Lohia in Feminist Theory,” in Economic and Political
Weekly (February 2014).
71 Naoko Shimazu, “Women ‘Performing’ Diplomacy at the Bandung Conference of
1955,” in Bandung at 60: New Insights and Emerging Forces, ed. Darwis Khudori (Yogyakarta:
Pustaka Pelajar, 2015).
72 First ASC Report, 95.
73 Kyaw Zaw Win, “1953 Asian Socialist Conference.”
74 Ibid., 51.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 75this early period of post-colonial solidarity showed a significant and
unrecognized positive engagement with human rights by representa-
tives of decolonized nations, who valued self-determination alongside a
respect for individual rights.75 Moreover, as Burke concludes, these
early Asian engagements with human rights repudiate characteriza-
tions of human rights as uniquely “Western.”76
In his examination of the competing rights discourses between
European and Asian socialists at the ASC, Imlay argues that one of the
key differences was in their views of nationalism. While European
socialism “had always regardednationalismas potentially dangerous” and
saw “human rights” as the basis for minority rights, Asian socialists were
fundamentally concerned with nationalism.77 Yet while seeking an end
to colonialism was the major concern in their applicability of human
rights, Asian socialists were highly aware of the dangers of nationalism in
Europe and Asia. At the ASC, Sjahrir’s seminar on “Nationalism and
Internationalism” outlined the problem of nationalities in Europe as one
of “oppressed minorities,” leading to the beginnings of the First World
War. Imlay quotes Sjahrir’s reference to nationalism, forAsians, as “quite
a natural thing” and a “source of new life and strength.”78 But he fails to
put this in the context of Sjahrir’s thoughts on nationalism in this speech
and in his wider body of thought. In his speech, Sjahrir also argued that
“Nationalism in the extreme form is irrational and will lead to disaster”
and that “emotional nationalismhas tobedeveloped intomaturity, into a
rational and responsible nationalism.”79 Sjahrir’s distrust of “emotional”
and “irrational” nationalism generated criticism from a number of
scholars of Indonesian history, particularly Benedict Anderson.80
Anderson argued that Sjahrir was too quick to dismiss the excitement
and energy of youth in the Indonesian Revolution, but what he
acknowledged about Sjahrir was “the moral strength of his impassioned
pleas for the humane treatment of the Chinese, Eurasians and other
minority groups, and his sensitive awareness of the degradation of many
sectors of traditional society.”81 Sjahrir’s party drew to it individuals from
diverseethnic groupspreciselybecauseofhisbelief in social equalityanda
transcendent humanism that superseded race or religion. Asian socialist75 Roland Burke, “‘The Compelling Dialogue of Freedom’: Human Rights at the
Bandung Conference,” Human Rights Quarterly (2006): 962.
76 Burke, 965.
77 Imlay, 1111.
78 Sjahrir as quoted in Imlay, 1110.
79 Sjahrir, “Nationalism and Internationalism,” 15, 19.
80 See Anderson, Java and Legge, Intellectuals and Nationalism.
81 See Anderson, “Introduction,” to Sutan Sjahrir, Our Struggle, 14.
76 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019intellectuals had learned much about the diverse components of
nationalism in the strikes they organized, the colonial prison cells they
shared (in some cases over several years), and themulti-ethnic resistance
movements they led.
For these Asian socialists, the basis of the state rested on a rational,
egalitarian social order, rather than revolutionary spirit. The focus on
anti-colonial nationalism did not preclude an appreciation for minority
rights: this was encapsulated in the belief that the state would address
the equality of all, irrespective of caste or creed. We see in the
resolutions on “Common Asian Problems” condemnation of religious
and communal fanaticism, cautioning against the rise of religious and
ethnic nationalism. We see reference to the rise of “political apathy” in
Asia and the need for “political education” and “purposeful action.”82
Along with a condemnation of foreign exploitation and feudalism,
underlying many of these resolutions was a distrust of the “ignorance of
the common masses”83 in becoming victims of foreign exploitation,
indigenous feudalism, and extremism. To counter this, the state’s task
was to ensure all citizens would engage in economic and political
activity. While Asian socialists were fundamentally concerned with
addressing exploitation caused by ignorance and lack of information,
this attitude towards the public was precisely what led to accusations of
elitism and consequently caused socialist parties to lose elections, as we
shall see.
While recognizing its roots in European socialism, Asian socialists
advocated a different vision of development: “While the democratic,
egalitarian and distributive impulses and achievements of European
socialism evoke the admiration of Asia, Asian socialism must be
dynamic instead of gradual, and, if necessary, must develop its own
methods of peaceful mass action.”84 The basis for agrarian development
in Asia included radical land reforms that abolished feudalism and
landlordism, introducing cooperatives, agricultural finance, and collec-
tive farms. The Israeli experience of the kibbutz was an important
model forAsian socialists, as were European “co-operatives” and indige-
nous models of village cooperation. Economic development relied on a
planned economy that ensured ownership and control over the means
of production, and “preferably State ownership of that sector of
economy where capital tends to accumulate, such as financial insti-
tutions like banks and insurance companies, big industries, and foreign82 First ASC Report, 99.
83 Ibid., 98.
84 Ibid., 99–100.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 77trade.”85 This, again, mirrored the experience of the post-colonial
Burmese state, which, well before Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez
Company, had begun to nationalize a number of foreign assets and
activities, including foreign-owned transport and teak firms that had
reaped the profits from Burma’s raw materials.
The final set of resolutions laid the basis for the support of liberation
movements in Southeast Asia and the African continent. Asian
socialists sought active cooperation with freedom struggles to “give
these movements a socialist orientation” and safeguard them from the
designs of Capitalists and Communists. They urged representatives of
the Socialist International and International Union of Socialist Youth
to take a firm stance on the question of colonialism and end the
repression of liberation movements in Asia and Africa. The ASC
demanded that detained nationalist leaders in Malaya and Kenya be
immediately released, that freedom of assembly and the press be
immediately restored in Kenya, and that the demands of the Uganda
National Congress for elections be immediately granted. It condemned
policies of racial supremacy in South Africa, and expressed full support
for liberation movements in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. There was
a significant omission of Indochina in its list of Asian countries to be
liberated from colonialism, suggesting contention over whether the
ASC should support the Viet Minh.86 Indonesian news reports of the
conference show that Indochina was clearly discussed as a critique of
French colonial policy.87 In a subsequent bureau meeting at Hyderabad,
Kyaw Nyein expressed his frustration that Ho Chi Minh, to whom the
Socialists had once maintained close relations, had been pushed further
towards Russia and China, partly because of India’s refusal to take a
stand on the French re-occupation of Indochina, as they had with the
Dutch re-occupation of Indonesia; the Indonesian delegate agreed that
the ASC should take a stand on Vietnamese independence, regardless
of Ho’s commitment to communism.88 The ASC decided it could not
look on passively at the situation in Indochina; a “fact-finding”mission
was planned for the following year to gather information to mobilize
world public opinion.8985 Ibid.
86 Trager, “Burma’s Foreign Policy,” 95.
87 Despatch from the U.S. Embassy, Jakarta to Department of State re: “Abadi
Comments on the Rangoon Socialist Conference,” January 20, 1953. RG 85 U.S. Embassy,
Burma 1953–1955 Box 3. NARA asyumi report.
88 “Report of the BureauMeeting of the Asian Socialist Conference held at Hyderabad”
in Myanmar National Archives AG-15/3(3) Acc-062 (henceforth Hyderabad Report).
89 Ibid.
78 JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, JUNE 2019After ten days of committee meetings, the groundwork of Asian
socialism was thus set forth in the conference’s joint resolutions. The
ASCwas to be no less than the vehicle to ensure that the world lived up
to the internationalist principles of the United Nations and promote
the self-determination of all nations in the interests of world peace. At
its heart was the democratic socialist state, one that would be arrived
at by each country suitable to local conditions, and enable every
individual, regardless of ethnicity, gender, religion, or class, to develop
to their fullest potential, with adequate access to education, health, and
social services. It would temper the excesses of unfettered capitalism
and foreign exploitation through nationalization of specific industries
and focus on grassroots development from the village level up; it would
avoid the totalitarian impulses of Soviet communism through its basis
in democratic institutions that protected freedom of speech and
association. As Soedjatmoko had observed, nationalism was to be the
rangka, the framework, for the spread of democratic socialism through-
out the post-colonial world. Whether the public would endorse this
vision was another story.TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKING AND NATIONAL IMPLOSION
The outcome of the Asian Socialist Conference was an agreement to
establish a permanent Secretariat at Rangoon. An office was set up at 4
Wingaba Road, the address of the Burma Socialist Party, in a leafy
residential area of Rangoon near the home of the assassinated
nationalist leader Aung San. U Ba Swe was unanimously elected as
Chairman of the ASC, but over the next three years, the work of the
ASC was shared between a dedicated set of socialist organizers, all in
place by the end of December 1953. The General-Secretary of the
ASC, from Indonesia, was Wijono, who settled in Rangoon for a
number of years with his wife Sujatin, active in both the socialist and
women’s movement in Indonesia. U Hla Aung, formerly a member of
Burma’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, became Joint-Secretary alongside
his duties as a Burmese delegate to the United Nations. Madhu Limaye
andMadhav Gokhale, active in the Praja Socialist Party, consecutively
served as Joint Secretaries from India, along with Roo Watanabe and
Chisato Tatebayashi from the Japanese Socialist Party. In August 1954,
after its second bureau meeting in Hyderabad, the ASC agreed to the
establishment of the Anti-Colonial Bureau, specifically dedicated to
supporting liberation movements in Malaya and Africa. The African
connection, as Gerard McCann examines elsewhere in this issue, was
Lewis: Asian Socialism 79solidified through the figure of James Markham of the Gold Coast’s
Convention People’s Party, who joined the group at 4 Wingaba Road
later that year.
With the publication of Socialist Asia, between 1952 and 1957, and
theAnti-Colonial Bureau Newsletter, edited by Markham between 1954
and 1955, Rangoon became an information hub for socialism and
anti-colonial solidarity. Subscriber numbers proved disappointing
compared to the number of circulars sent out to socialist parties
around the world.90 But these publications nonetheless served as an
important outlet for the more active members of the Asian Socialist
Conference to exchange ideas and reach out to new audiences. The
ASC office hosted a number of international visitors, aided by the
prominence of Rangoon on international air routes. The ASC’s foot-
soldiers engaged in a flurry of transnational networking across Asia
and Africa. In 1953, Wijono traveled to Stockholm for the Third
Congress of the Socialist International, where he criticized European
socialist parties for refusing to take a strong stance against colonialism.
U Hla Aung, meanwhile, traveled to Central Africa and Gold Coast
in December 1953, before arriving at the United Nations the
following month to address the UN General Assembly. Referring to
the continuing colonial exploitation he had witnessed on his travels
in Africa, he accused the collective conscience of the world of being
“dulled by its preoccupations with the cold war” and criticized the
United States for failing to intervene.91 In 1954, Wijono led the afore-
mentioned study mission to Indo-China and Malaya with Watanabe
and Markham to study social, economic, and political conditions in
both countries. In various international fora, these representatives
campaigned vigorously against the continuation of colonialism and
the need to de-escalate Cold War tensions through disarmament and
allegiance to the principles of the United Nations. These protests
proved effective: by 1956, arguments within the Socialist Interna-
tional—particularly between British and Scandinavian socialists
against the French—made reference to the disenchantment of
socialist brothers in Asia with European socialists’ colonial policies.92
Speaking to the journalist and activist Alijah Gordon, U Ba Swe
showed how conscious ASC members were of their influence on
European socialists: “For the first time they are beginning to take
positions against colonialism, against imperialism . . . They are90 Rose, 239; Hyderabad Report.
91 “The Problems of the Colonial Peoples,” Anti-Colonial Bureau 6 (1955).
92 Imlay, 1118.
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they have taken a clear-cut stand on the question of colonialism.”93
Despite these overtures to internationalism, one of the most
discernible tensions emerging within the Asian Socialist Conference
was between delegates from Israel and Arab nations, both considered
part of “West Asia.” At the first conference, Egyptian delegates had
walked out of the conference due to the presence of Israel’s Moshe
Sharrett. Israel’s presence was due in part to the increasingly close ties
between Burma and Israel as new socialist nations in the post-war
period. Rose notes that while socialist parties from Indonesia and
Pakistan had been wary about Israel’s presence at the conference, the
personable nature of the Israeli delegates changed their minds.94 By the
time of the Hyderabad meeting in August 1953, overtures to Arab
parties had been made, probably stemming from the relationship
between Indian and Lebanese socialists; Kamal Djumblatt, the head of
Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party, had visited India in 1951, writing
a joint manifesto with Praja socialists rejecting colonialism as well as
militaristic and xenophobic nationalism, and promoting the Third
Force as an instrument of peace.95 Djumblatt and his wife attended the
Hyderabad meeting as delegates and spoke to the challenges faced by
socialists in West Asia, struggling against military dictatorship, local
feudalism, and imperialist intrigues in a strategic and rich oil-producing
region.96 He advocated that the ASC send greetings to all West Asian
Socialist parties, whether dissolved, underground, or in exile, and
support the position of Egypt on Suez. Other tensions emerged at the
meeting, including the question of how to deal with Communist
China:Mehta and Djumblatt argued that the ASC should not have any
contact with Chinese communists because of their closeness to Soviet
Russia, while the Burmese referred toMao’s movement as independent,
arguing that if denied outside contacts China would be pushed even
further into the Soviet camp.97
The third bureau meeting of the Asian Socialist Conference was
planned in Bandung for April 1954. However, Sukarno’s government
refused to grant visas to Israeli socialists for fear of offending Arab
nations, to which it was cultivating close ties. In an official statement,
the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) cited other reasons, including93 Gordon, 321.
94 Rose, 9.
95 “The Right of the Way,” Socialist Asia 2, no. 10 (1954): 10–11.
96 Hyderabad Report.
97 Ibid.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 81Sukarno’s fear of offending Indonesian communists, and the refusal by
his party to give Indonesian socialists the publicity which the holding
of the conference in Indonesia would have given them.98 That April,
Prime Ministers of Indonesia, Burma, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka met in
Colombo for an informal discussion of the impact of the Cold War in
Asia.99 It was here that Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo
proposed holding an Asian-African Conference in Bandung the follo-
wing year. Israel was not to be invited to Bandung, despite the protests
of U Nu. It is difficult to know whether the push by the Indonesian
Nationalist Party (PNI) to hold the conference in Bandung was at all
influenced by the activities of the Asian Socialist Conference, to which
one of its rival parties belonged, but it is notable that Sastroadmidjojo
proposed it the same month that the Asian socialists were to hold their
third bureau meeting in Bandung, and that the more famous 1955Asia-
Africa conference happened exactly one year later. Throughout the
1950s the PSI functioned as a “brains-trust,” in which its policy
recommendations were read carefully by Indonesia’s political elite.100
Sastroadmidjojo may well have been aware of the conferences and
recommendations emerging from Rangoon for a “Third Force” and
“Afro-Asian solidarity.” Regardless, the Bandung Conference worked
towards the political marginalization of the PSI in Indonesia: one of its
major impacts on the Indonesian political scene was its benefit to
Sastroamidjojo’s government and the PNI in the months running up to
the September 1955 elections.101
With the plan to hold the meeting in Bandung cancelled, the
ASC’s third bureau meeting was subsequently moved to Kalaw, a breezy
former hill station in Burma’s Shan state. U Ba Swe began the
conference in Kalaw with a strong criticism of the Indonesian
Government’s action in obstructing the meeting, as well as a criticism
of the Pakistan Government for refusing visas to delegates from the
Praja Socialist Party to attend the National Conference of the Pakistan
Socialist Party.102 The ASC issued a statement “deploring the actions
of national governments seeking to obstruct the principles of98 “Statement of Partai Sosialis Indonesia: On the Failure to Convene the Conference
Bureau Asian Socialists in Indonesia,” in FO 371/11928 Reports on Meetings of the Asian
Socialist Conference, TNA.
99 See Cindy Ewing, “The Colombo Powers: Crafting Diplomacy in the Third World
and Launching Afro-Asia at Bandung,” Cold War History (2018): 1–19.
100 Feith, 130.
101 The point is made in Feith, 392 and Mackie, 20.
102 Kalaw report (IUSY), “Asian Bureau May Formulate Plans for Korea, Indochina,”
The Nation (May 26, 1954).
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“division of Asia along communal lines cannot but have disastrous
consequences.”103 In these early years of post-colonial democracy, the
transnational ties among socialists across Asia were hampered by the
policies of national governments able to police their borders and
dictate who came in and out.
At the Kalaw meeting, U Kyaw Nyein drew headlines for his bold
description of Soviet imperialism as “neo-colonialism,”more dangerous
than the old imperialism in being “more ruthless, more systematic,
and more blatantly justified in the name of the world Communist
revolution.”104 Lohia publicly disagreed, objecting to any implication
that “one or other form of imperialism was less bad” and pointing to the
“barbaric” actions carried out by capitalist imperialisms in Indochina
and Kenya.105 U Kyaw Nyein tempered his assertions in response,
arguing that both forms of imperialism should be rejected, but Asian
socialists should not forget the potential dangers of Soviet imperialism.
For both Lohia and Kyaw Nyein, despite their apparent differences,
maintaining a sense of neutrality between the two camps was of utmost
importance. This disagreement did not preclude resolutions made at
the meeting, including a “Declaration on Colonialism” that upheld the
right to self-determination as recognized by the United Nations Char-
ter. Referring to freedom fighters around the world, the declaration
stated: “All genuine democrats fully share with these fighters their
passionate desire for human rights and freedom, and therefore associate
themselves with the struggle against colonial oppression and for a world
order free from slavery, hunger, political terror and war.”106
While the ASC pledged its commitment to the principles of
internationalism, many of its socialist parties faced continuing domes-
tic struggles in coming to power. Apart from the Burmese socialists, the
core group of members to the Asian Socialist Conference were not only
losing elections to bigger, more populist nationalist parties, but
suffering splits within their own ranks. While the Praja Socialist Party
was, in 1952, an effective opposition to the Congress Party, by 1955 it
had split. Critics accused the party leaders of espousing their own
political salvation, indulging in “fruitless abstractions.” But India’s
ruling Congress Party, by 1955, committed itself to the establishment of103 “Bureau A.S.C. Statement,” in International Union of Socialist Youth Archives
folder 1511, IISH.
104 Despatch from British Embassy, Rangoon to Anthony Eden, 1954 in FO 371/
111928; “A Timely Definition,” The Nation (May 25, 1954).
105 Lohia speech to the ASC Bureau meeting in Kalaw, 1954 (TNA).
106 Report of the ASC Bureau Meeting in Kalaw, 1954 (Myanmar National Archives).
Lewis: Asian Socialism 83a socialist pattern, and in the ensuing years co-opted various members
of the Praja Socialist Party within its ranks,107 while others would play
an active role in protest and activist movements.108 In Indonesia, while
the membership of the Indonesian Socialist Party had grown to 50,000,
the Communist Party had ten times as many members and the Indo-
nesianNationalist Party had membership in the millions. In September
1955, a few months after the Bandung conference, the Indonesian
Socialist Party stood for elections, and lost miserably. This was partly
due to a lack of campaigning, with Sjahrir refusing to engage in “cheap
politics” and “demagogy,” while Sukarno’s Indonesian Nationalist
Party cultivated a cult of personality around its leader, employing
nationalist symbols, slogans, and theatricality.109 The PSI had focused
on establishing itself as an intellectual “cadre” party that sought to
educate the people; popular mobilization would come later.110
Meanwhile, Burma’s Socialist Party suffered a shock after General
Elections in April 1956, where the formidable AFPFL coalition scraped
a majority but lost a large number of seats to the opposition left-wing
coalition known as the National United Front, which blamed the
APFLF for failing to bring peace, security, and economic prosperity to
the country.111 In the atmosphere of the early Cold War, as local
communist parties gained power by providing an alternative to the
political and economic dislocations of the post-colonial era, the
technocratic ideals of democratic socialism proved a hard sell.
In November 1956, the Asian Socialist Conference convened its
second major conference in Bombay, the industrial heartland of India’s
Socialist Party since the 1930s.112 New delegations appeared from
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Ceylon. Delegates from further afield
included Joseph Murumbi from Kenya and a member of the Popular
Socialist Party of Chile. There were notable absences, particularly from
Arab nations. Two major events formed the international backdrop of
the conference: the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution. A
subcommittee of representatives from India, Burma, Indonesia, and
Japan drafted an initial resolution on the two crises. The following day,
U Ba Swe (Fig. 3), now Burma’s PrimeMinister, opened the conference107 “The Praja Socialist Party in India: A Final Assessment.”
108 See Kent-Carrasco, “A Battle Over Meanings,” 384.
109 Mrazek, 430; Feith, 316.
110 Feith, 130.
111 Joseph Silverstein, “Politics, Parties, and National Elections in Burma,” Far Eastern
Survey 25, no. 12 (1956): 180–181.
112 John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India: M.N. Roy and
Comintern Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 228.
IGURE 3. U Hla Aung, Genda Singh, U Ba Swe, and Wijono presiding over
he Bombay Socialist Conference (International Institute of Social History
ollection).
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Cwith a speech condemning the actions of Britain and France as well as
the Soviet retaliation against the Hungary. He lambasted Britain and
France, as members of the Security council, who had “wantonly
attacked Egypt . . . All moral codes and human decency on which the
UN was founded were thus shattered.”113 He referred to the struggle of
both Poland and Hungary in seeking independence from Soviet
control. He simultaneously paid tribute to the United Nations Organi-
zation and its agencies for raising living standards and upholding
human rights. Despite all its teething problems, the Asian Socialist
Conference still saw itself as the guardian of international peace,
particularly when those who held power on the UN security council
failed to live up to its ideals.113 Dispatch from Embassy, New Delhi to Department of State, Washington, DC,
December 26, 1956. RG 84 Burma: U.S. Embassy General Records, 1953–1958 UD2186,
NARA.
Lewis: Asian Socialism 85The following year saw the collapse of the democratic socialist vision
in Indonesia and Burma. In 1957, Sukarno instituted his policy of
“Guided Democracy,” undoing Sjahrir’s constitutional guarantees. In
1959he reintroduced theConstitutionof1945, whichgave thePresident
full executive powers. While calling for an end to neo-imperialism and
the establishment of a socialist society, he dissolved parliament and
banned both the liberal Islamic party Masjumi and the Indonesian
Socialist Party in1960. Privately, ina positionpaper tohis PSI colleagues,
Sjahrir communicated his fears of violence and the emotional pull of
ethnic-based regionalist movements as detrimental to the unity of
Indonesian public life, and his “sickness” at the military repression that
followed.114 In 1962, under rumors of a “PSI conspiracy,” Sjahrir was put
under house arrest, along with other socialist intellectuals. Rosihan
Anwar, a journalist close to Sjahrir, talked with an “Asian diplomat”,
utterly confused aboutwhat had happened toSjahrir, who “togetherwith
Nehru, was the famousman ofAsia . . . Could the problems between him
and Sukarno possibly make him vanish like this?”115 In prison, Sjahrir
buried himself in the literature of Marx, Rosa Luxemberg, and Max
Weberbefore sufferinga strokeand losinghis ability to speakandwrite.116
After his death far from Indonesia in 1966, in a hospital in Geneva,
Sjahrir’s body was returned to Indonesia and given a state funeral, with
Sukarno still formally in office in the aftermath of the military coup that
brought Suharto to power.
In Burma, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, led by U Nu,
finally split apart in 1958. As Frank Trager notes, this “political
divorce” had its roots in fatigue: the two components of the AFPFL had
spent too much time together over two decades and were overstretched
in their responsibilities (post-war Burma had not only lost a generation
of political leaders in the assassination of Aung San and his cabinet in
1947, but also a great number of Indian civil servants that had staffed
the colonial government).117 Foreign experts blamed the failure of
Pyidawtha on its leadership and lack of technical expertise; the plan
also relied on income from rice exports that failed to materialize after
the end of the KoreanWar caused a worldwide drop in rice prices.118 In114 Sjahrir, “Peninjauaun dan Pernilaian” (1958), as quoted in Mrazek, 453.
115 Rosihan Anwar, Sebelum Prahara (1962), as quoted in Mrazek, 465.
116 Mrazek, 473–480.
117 Frank N. Trager, “Political Divorce in Burma,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (1959):
317–327; See also Ian Brown, “Tracing Burma’s Economic Failure to its Colonial
Inheritance,” The Business History Review 85, no. 4 (2011): 725–747.
118 See Louis Walinsky, “The Rise and Fall of U Nu,” Pacific Affairs 38, no. 3/4 (1965):
269–281; Trager, “Burma’s Foreign Policy”; Than, 652.
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was asked to provide a “caretaker government,” as U Nu renounced his
worldly possessions and temporarily resorted to the life of a Buddhist
monk. During this time, Ne Win ruthlessly put down the disorder
emerging in both the countryside and the city and arrested a number of
political leaders from U Nu’s and U Ba Swe’s groups. The press
published a letter where Ba Swe openly consented to an extension of
Ne Win’s term in office until elections could be held in 1960. U Nu’s
party captured a majority, with Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein’s faction losing
miserably; the public believed they had become too close to the
military.119 In 1962, Ne Win overthrew U Nu’s democratically elected
government and seized power. Ba Swe was detained for a short while,
and then released to live in retirement in Rangoon, passing away in
1987. Kyaw Nyein, meanwhile, was detained by the military
government for some years, and released only in January 1967. After
years of cultivating a vision of the democratic socialist state both within
Burma and with Asian nations, and professing a commitment to
internationalism and allegiance to the UN Charter of human rights,
Burmese socialists found themselves in a xenophobic prison, one at
least partly of their own making.CONCLUSION
In an article published soon after the 1953 Kalaw Conference, Edward
Lawyone, the editor of Rangoon’s popular Nation newspaper and a
cautious supporter of the Asian Socialist Conference, suggested that
socialists had not “proved themselves revolutionary enough to capture
the masses in a period of great political ferment in the area.” Where
socialism grew well in the “sheltered climate of advanced political
democracy,” he argued, it “appears to lack the dynamism to cope with
more violent political situations.”120 Asian nations were coping with
rapid political transitions against the backdrop of turbulent Cold War
geopolitics. Domestic cleavages were exacerbated by responses to Cold
War flashpoints, as the broad leftist coalitions born out of anti-colonial119 On the long and complex history between the BSP and the post-war reorganisation
of the Burmese military see Mary Callahan,Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) and “The Sinking Schooner: Murder and the State
in Independent Burma,” inGangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia, ed. Carl A.
Trocki (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
120 “Asian Socialists and Realism,” The Nation (May 26, 1954).
Lewis: Asian Socialism 87struggles split into two over the Korean War, Vietnam, and the
continuing popular appeal of international Communism. In Burma and
Indonesia, this was fed by a propaganda war waged by American and
Soviet intelligence officers, with one bloc smearing Marxist ideology
and upholding “freedom” alongside capitalism, and the other engaged,
in the words of a Soviet diplomat in Rangoon, in the “penetration and
subversion of local regimes, direct and active participation in the
struggle between different political parties.”121
And yet in the years of its existence, the Asian Socialist Conference
provided a venue for some of the most thoughtful intellectuals in a
region stretching from Cairo to Tokyo to come together for a
momentary escape from the realm of fractious national politics. They
devised a collective and humanist vision for post-colonial society that
was equitable to all men and women, regardless of religion or ethnicity,
providing for the welfare of all. The ASC devoted itself to the cause of
national liberation, seeking out information and personal connections
about socialist parties and freedom movements throughout Asia and
Africa. As they fought ideological and propaganda battles at home,
delegates at the ASC remained committed to the idea that the model of
democratic socialism would constitute a way out of the ColdWar. In an
interview given to the American journalist Louis Fischer, U Ba Swe
stated “we not believe in a group of Third Force governments but in
people’s force, the force of the people who want peace.” Fischer
protested, “but that will take fifty years.” Ba Swe responded, “Maybe
not fifty years, twenty years. If we are lucky we will get there.”122 Asian
socialists believed that the force of public opinion would be behind
their vision, but that this would take time. They did not foresee such a
rapid fall from power, but nonetheless their vision of an alternative
“third way” was one that continued to have purchase.
Indonesian and Burmese socialists, forgotten as some of the most
active proponents of this vision, were particularly vulnerable to the rise
of military-backed authoritarian regimes. These regimes borrowed ideas
from socialist intellectuals but abandoned the democratic values which
they advocated so strongly. Whereas Burmese socialist intellectuals of
the 1950s were keen to learn from the experiences of socialist,
communist, and democratic countries, Ne Win—under the guise of a
“BurmeseWay to Socialism”—closed off Burmese civil society from the
outside world. The ascendancy of Suharto in a U.S.-backed 1965
military coup decimated the Indonesian Communist Party, resulting in121 A. Kaznavcheev, Inside a Soviet Embassy (Lippincott, 1962).
122 Interview with U Ba Swe by Louis Fischer.
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having communist sympathies and an erasure of the Left in state-led
narratives of Indonesian history. Some Indonesian socialists remained
fierce critics of the Suharto regime, others were co-opted as
modernizing technocrats.
While the vision of Asian socialists was defeated politically, it
nonetheless left legacies in the realm of civil society and the
contribution of Asian and African nations to the new international
order. Socialist intellectuals like Soedjatmoko would serve in the
United Nations, and U Thant, political secretary to both U Nu and U
Ba Swe would become its third Secretary-General. Student protests and
democratic protests flared up throughout periods of authoritarian rule
in Burma and Indonesia, in which the students and children of socialist
intellectuals participated.123 Discourses of democracy, human rights,
individual freedom and dignity, and a more egalitarian social order have
become increasingly important to generations of activists in challen-
ging authoritarian rule as well as those working in the field of social
policy and women’s and LGBT rights, and perhaps owe more to these
earlier generations of activists and intellectuals than current trends in
globalisation. The democratic challenges to Southeast Asia’s author-
itarian regimes in the 1980s, 1990s, or the beginning of themillennium,
were not new phenomenon, but one with perhaps deeper roots. Asian
socialists devised a collective vision of social welfare alongside indivi-
dual and political freedom that stretched from the village to the state
and across the boundaries of nations, providing an alternative draft of
internationalism to the diplomatic machinations of Bandung.123 Examples include the Malari incident in Indonesia, a student protest often blamed
on socialist intellectuals, and the U Thant funeral crisis, in which U Ba Swe’s daughters
participated. U Kyaw Nyein’s daughter Cho Cho Kyaw Nyein was active in the 1988
democracy movement.
